Showing posts with label privacy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label privacy. Show all posts

19 June 2013

I am not Harry Truman

I received a email from a customer, followed by a phone call, to the effect they had received huge number of email 'return' bounces to a general intake email address.  He and I have had this discussion before

I have written about email sender forgery (There is probably NOT an email account: godzilla@microsoft.com) and its fallout ("Customer: My cousin says that his email to me is not going through") before.  So let's take the time to think it through yet again

Takeaway: He wanted me to stop such pieces from cluttering their email box, but he is unwilling to have 'heavy' spam filtering

As a personal matter, and also wearing my sysadmin hat, I would like to stop seeing this cruft as well

But as a technical matter, it seems that it cannot easily be done without constant 'tuning' of rejection rules or some other rather serious matching of 'Message-ID' of pieces sent against return pieces offered.  An attempt to do so through filtering tools with no prior knowledge of Message-ID's sent, is to always 'play defense' against the spammers, without an ability ever score a 'win'.  The effort to match Message-Id's in offered return pieces is perhaps more promising

But, so far, no-one has been sufficiently vexed by it in the FOSS community to publish such a tool and to commit do doing do the ongoing 'tuning' of message parsers needed.  Perhaps we can design around it with existing tools, and amending our outgoing pieces by adding a certification that a given candidate email is truly from us

As a design matter, building a milter, writing some procmail rules, and parsing sendmail logs, probably into a database backend, as my first thought as to how I would approach the matter.  The database constraint is troubling, though.  I have other work that I need to attend to first, but I went through the thought process.  I memorialize that process in part in case someone is interested.  Even more, I will provide webspace, mailing list support, and a VCS gratis, if someone 'feels the itch'.  It would be useful to have, but is not urgent to attain -- Seven Habits Quadrant 2 or 4 stuff.  Absent such a volunteer effort or a paying customer, for me, Quadrant 4

Or, version two, a trusted cohort of outbound mailservers could build a MAC MIME Multipart attachment for each outbound message, and also a second MIME attachment that is cryptographically validated 'clearsign' of that MAC part.  Possibly bundle this up into a Multipart Related set of structured attachments.  Add these two new MIME attachments to all messages on every outbound piece.  The first part -- the MAC part -- would be based a hash of the message body, plus a timestamp of seconds since Epoch or such, and other optional entropy, to avoid forgery and replay attacks

Later then, when a putative return is offered, only accept for further processing those returns that had a validating pair of MIME attachments, produced based on a re-hash the message body in chief, and that MAC section's timestamp; and  that had previously clearsigned by it. Discard stale stuff, and non-validating content. This gets rid of the need for the database and simplifies the procmail rules.  A well-formed candidate return piece can carry around all that is needed to known to decide if one will pass a mail return message along to human eyes

Not free, as it will burn up compute cycles on every send, and a few more at return time, but also complete and under controllable locally so resistant to spammers.  Avoids the database requirement, so it can scale out. Most of the needed tools already exist as FOSS.  hmmm


The protocols governing what constitutes: email permit a sender to enter whatever 'return address, and 'sender address' they wish on a piece of email.  It is trivial to find a 'open' relay to accept email to send to any third party.  Consider the analogy:
  • All the while being careful to not leave a fingerprint or other biometric, I use cash to purchase a post card at the corner store, along with a stamp
  • I address it to someone of tender sensibilities, and assert that I noticed that their car was parked outside the local 'adult entertainment' establishment
  • I sign it: Harry S Truman
  • I enter a 'return address' of:

  Harry S Truman
  President Emeritus
  1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
  Washington DC  20500
  • I mail it


  • The recipient is outraged to find such a libelous assertion, visible for their letter carrier to see, and demands that the person who did so be identified, and stopped.  Also, for good measure, they want the Postal Service Inspectors to get on the matter to prevent such heartbreaking assertions to never happen again

    About all the Postal Service will offer to do in the usual case is to return the piece to its nominal sender. And he no longer receives mail at that address

    (I note parenthetically that the Postal Service DOES seem to scan images of ALL paper mail passing through their system)


    Stopping spam (here: bounce backsplatter and 'joe jobs') is just not going to turn out to have a durable, easy, and comprehensive solution, without re-thinking what we send looks like.  Spammers and legitimate receivers are in a 'arms race' and today's fix will rot if senders can re-engineer around the fixes.  If this state of affairs distresses a person greatly and until I can get that MIME solution going to test my hypothesis: stop reading email; hire a full time, 24x7 secretary to pre-read all email and toss the junk.; turn up the filtering and accept the false positives; grow a thick skin

    Or, of course, start coding and beat me to it

    24 February 2010

    Caller ID, wiretapping, call recording, and the federal Do Not Call list

    There is a witches brew of rules that people making outbound telephone calls need to thread through. Also, the recipient of a call needs to observe some as well. Let's start in reverse order: 
    Caller ID single line unit with serial out

    Particularly, in the US, some states require consent from only ONE party to a telephone communication; others require TWO [or ALL, in the case of a conference call] participants to so consent. The asserted misconduct case of Linda Tripp in Maryland comes to mind. Linda got into some hot water for chatting up Monica's lovelife with some girltalk about Bill Clinton and recording it without needed consents from "that woman, Ms. Lewinsky" and then turning those recordings over to Kenneth Starr's office

    Neither side of the aisle is without stain in this space, it seems; recall that back earlier in the Clinton administration that a couple in Florida recorded a conference call bridge leg, on which the cell phone conversation of Representative John Boehner (R-Ohio), was connected. They later pled out to a criminal charge concerning this. That call (said to have been intercepted within the state of Florida through a common radio scanner) also included then-Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich and other House Republican leadership folks. The tape turned up, inter alia, into the possession of Representative James McDermott (D-Wash.), who then flipped the tape to The New York Times and the Atlanta Journal-Constitution. This drew a lawsuit from Boehner against McDermott, seeking to impose to civil liability for violation of the federal [anti-]wiretap law, alleging that no effective consent existed

    Stock brokers commonly record ALL calls, and I assume have paperwork in place at account opening time, that effectively and irrevocably obtain consent to such monitoring and recordation, and as I think it through, must contain some sort of representation and warranty by the customer that all parties connected from their side of the call brought in have also consented. Clearly, sometimes this turns out NOT to be the case, and yet I do not recall seeing any litigation as to improper recording of a conference bridge. Curious

    And then there is the federal Do Not Call list -- seemingly a shield for the consumer to ward off unwanted solicitation calls from unknown third parties. All the phone numbers under my control have been registered with the enforcing agency, the FTC, and should be showing up on the database tapes for telephone solicitors to elide. This does not happen of course -- sadly, anonymous VOIP calls, false and forged Caller ID information, and simple omission of caller ID data prevails; the ways to dodge the requirement are well know to telemarketers, it seems

    But I have been working in the caller ID adjunct industry -- if you need real time screen pop information of inbound callers, I have been a rep for TelComp -- for longer than I care to remember. Be sure to mention that Russ sent you if you call Larry directly, or contact me for a system design and suggested implementation

    I was on the phone with Larry earlier today. We have provided the web and email presence since the start. The domain registration says 1995, but I know we did a trade show in LA before that with a web presence up. I was doing a bit of debugging on SMTP AUTH issues with him. Commonly we will leave an open line when we do this, and I listened to him field calls for an hour or so. Larry is endlessly patient on support calls, and I hope to be as patient when I am doing support. ;)  a BOFH

    The call had discussed industry trends and practices, and in part the topics of this blog post were fresh in my mind, for we 'talked shop' during running down his email issue

    The next call, not two minutes later, went like this:

    Phone rings, and the caller ID has no name information, is from a number not known in a lookup to my real time 'whitelist' database, and is from out of the local area code --- a potential outbound solicitation call

    Me: Good afternoon. May I help you?

    Other party identifies himself as calling from "Merchant Services" and asks for 'the decision maker' at my business.

    Me: That's me, all right; we have a practice and policy of recording all calls for quality and training purposes. May I have your consent to such recording, please?

    Other party: (confused) uhh -- OK, I guess

    Me: Great, and thank you. How may I help you?

    Other party: Well, I am calling about your merchant services account. I was calling to make sure you were getting the best rate ...

    Me: (interrupting) Sure -- thanks. What is your firm's name and address please?

    Other party: ummm

    Me: (interrupting) ... you see, I need that because this is a residential number that is on the Do Not Call list, and I need that information to send the lawsuit papers to ...

    Other party: (click)

    Much more satisfying that simply silently hanging up at my end. Feel free to "clip and save" this handy outline. A copy to crib from at each phone just may come in handy  zing

    26 March 2009

    "It's different, this time"

    Winston Smith

    The British born, formerly American investment manager, Sir John Templeton, is attributed the following as to his craft:

    The four most dangerous words in investing are 'This time it's different.'

    I suspect the quip is over-constrained in limiting it to just investing. But I am meditating about another Briton's work

    At last night's COLUG meeting, the presenter addressed the emergence of the latest round of internet based 'social networking' applications: twitter, facebook, blogging, multi-features personal information devices (cell phones, Blackberries, iTouchs, digital cameras and the like). I say latest round, because the assertion was made that: "Terrorists have never used photo reconnaissance" and contrarian I suggested that the people of Dresden might have a different point of view

    The takeaway from the matter had to be a thoughtful person needs to be mindful of the obvious and non-obvious implications of these new technologies

    The ability to build a 'mosaic' image of a person, from their public 'internet persona' is only getting easier, and more accessible to a wider audience of potential prying eyes. What once required the resources of a government or major multi-national corporation to 'dig out' are perhaps thoughtlessly revealed with all good intention. See, e.g., the 'Sarah' PSA: ("Online Sexual Exploitation - Everyone Knows Your Name"), which ends with the outline: "... so think before you post"

    But the information leakage is much broader than that already, and at this point not controllable by any individual. When a member of a 'private' or 'backwater' mailing list uses GMail to subscribe, every poster suddenly is added to Google's indexing corpus; when someone at a local meeting snaps a cell phone picture and posts it publicly, it feeds the automated identification algorithms publicly known (Google's Photo), and otherwise (Think: the Tampa Bay Super Bowl photo identification effort of the crowd). Note the date of the Register article just cited: 7th February 2001. This was no Bush-ian crypto facist over-reaction to the 9/11 hijackings

    During the presentation last night, the first advert link offered was for anti-aging patent drugs, along side the meeting photo (full of several grey haired and bald male persons; the second link was of 'Valerie Bertinelli -- Bikini Babe!' and had a weight loss advert in the 'doubleclick' advert box on the top right; but our presenter is interested in and follows a television show 'The Biggest Loser' and is browsing weight control related sites and mailing lists. A third, rather personal example from the presenter's prior experience completed the circle to make it clear that Google's advert engine is reading every word we read or write

    The first time is an occurence; the second a co-incidence; after the third, one has to stop shaving with Occam's razor as the blade has gone dull

    blank advert

    I took a screenshot (full-size image) of what I am offered as to Valerie, and you'll notice that the upper right panel is blank. This is because some years ago, I amended the DNS records which computers using my DNS servers are provided, to return '127.0.0.2' for all of 'doubleclick.net'

    [root@xps400 conf]# grep -i doubleclick *.conf
    NULLROUTE.conf:127.0.0.2 ad.doubleclick.net.
    [root@xps400 conf]#

    Adding that value (which causes the request for an advert to never reach the central advert monitoring and image feeding servers), and several more was part of a campaign for a corporate client I was consulting for at the time. The Windows 98 desktop computers which were issued to the staff did not have effective software installation access controls, to preventing addition of random malware and time wasters. Memos and meetings had not stopped the practice of a staffer downloading, say, Yahoo! Instant Messenger, and showing all her friends in that department how to do the same. Bandwidth exhaustion was becoming an issue; I assume that management also had some thoughts about lost productivity

    As a technical fix the IS department was asked to remove it when found (done, but not persistent without effective access controls), and asked again. I was escalated in, and went to work with tcpdump

    It turns out that the software designers at Yahoo knew their craft well. From memory, it first tried the universal Firewall Transversal Protocol (http), and then secure http and FTP

    I blocked each new approach in turn. It fell back to nntp, and as I recall ntp. I do not recall that it tried to use dns content tunneling, but I certainly would have. The eventual solution had both port blocking and domain blacklisting

    There is nothing new, nor indeed to my thinking, wrong for the owner of an asset to seek to profit maximize with it. But I think my thoughts and my words are my property, and on occasion on a 'think piece', I'll add the copyright reminder tag


    .-- -... ---.. ... -.- -.--
    Copyright (C) 2009 R P Herrold
    herrold@owlriver.com
    My words are not deathless prose,
    but they are mine.
    Number 6

    I also hold to the quaint notion that I am not a number, but an individual and the property of no one but my God. Silly, I know, but there you are




    edit: typo fix

    20 March 2009

    Every step you take ...

    a completely trackable and traceable survey tool
    I received the above email [which I converted to a maskable image], with embedded web link, seeking market research data. I have masked the full URL, to prevent 'ballot box stuffing' and to protect my privacy

    Now in doing good statistical sampling, customarily one assures the recipient / respondent that the responses are aggregated, and that no personally identifying information is available to the researcher. This is done to foster truthfulness and frankness from people responding to the survey, by reassuring them that no information leaks, say back to the entity covered by the survey can tie particular positive or negative 'pull comments' to a specific person
    Other survey research techniques use 'calibration' questions, repeated in slightly varying form a couple of times in the survey, to make sure the respondent is actually reading the questions, is answering consistently, matches the 'shaped sample' desired demographic, and similar concerns

    Here, I am solemnly (or perhaps, cheerfully) assured:
    We will also gladly share the aggregate results of the survey with you, as it may be of interest to you.

    All responses will remain anonymous and confidential.

    What is does not say is that the author is not planning to use the data for selling 'individual drill down' detail by respondent

    The sender is sort of aware of this, or perhaps it is just a boilerplate footer from SurveyMonkey:

    This link is uniquely tied to this survey and your email address, please do not forward this message.
    I think I will pass on this one. Time for more coffee




    Revised to lay better in the top table 20 march 2009

    12 March 2009

    Embarrassingly parallel

    Bruce Schneier, in his 'Crypto-gram' summary this month, has an outlink to a story in The Register on a purported desire of the US NSA to crack Skype's call crypto


    But this misses the point -- the needed technology and infra-structure are out there already, fielded, and ready to go, pretty everywhere. Let's take a hypothetical country -- call it 'Glassware' ("US", "China" and "Elbonia" were taken)

    The country of Glassware has a population of M * 10 ^ N people

    Of those M * 10 ^ N people, the average family size is three, and there are an average of two cell phones and one television (the latest -- digital)

    There is a broadcast infrastructure suitable to distributing portions of a problem sample -- say, the header block -- sufficiently long that one can detect when a 'good' private key has been found, which is sufficient to decode something encoded with an asymmetric encoding public key.

    That target information is distributed over the airwaves, in the vertical blanking interval or sub-carrier side layer, itself encoded with a private key, readily decodeable with one of several 'factory included 'public keys'

    The power supply switches in the television sets do not actually place the sets into a 'No power drawn' mode -- just into a lower power use 'sleep' stand-by mode. When tickled with the right signal, and not otherwise engaged in presenting content to possessors of that unit (who might complain about glitches if the video graphics display processor did not fully paint their screen), it is possible to wake them up to do some ciphering. Good for them -- recycles the electrons, and so forth

    The television has a handy feature -- it will accept and display caller ID information from nearby affiliated cellular phones, over BlueTooth -- it can be configured to ONLY display wanted cell phones, but it will receive data and collate data from all ringing near it.

    So when Mrs Glassware has her girlfriends over, and the babysitter calls during the home sales party, the TV will pop up an alert for them of the call over the din of the fun.

    The TV also sends back, over SMS messages, duly encoded and encrypted, the logfiles to series of central collation points -- Father Glassware can see when the oldest son is over at the home of the girl from the wrong side of the tracks. The benefits are as broad as the imagination can see. Who could be against protecting the children?

    Those cell phones as it turns out are really not using very much of all that processing power they have in THEIR 'CUDA chips to draw those dinky screens, and are really off most of the time as well.

    Let's not waste their graphics processor chips as well, when they are on the charger. This is great, as it simplifies the math.

    Perhaps Glassware have an even better infrastructure -- say a national conversion to High Definition digital media signaling, and a mature broadband or cable modem backbone. All the better for shuttling information around digitally.

    A friend who deals with quants, tells me the quants are all hot and bothered to get 4 x quad head graphics cards in Dell Precision units -- 16 GPU's, because each of them can do a 10,000 (10 ^ 4) speedup over the simple general purpose processors in the underlying processors the chassis carry. All for under $10k a unit. They are doing the math and think they can have a huge HPC farm, just in the normal overhead which their traders and developers have to have anyway to do their day jobs.


    M is 3 in the US (we'll round to 4 to make the math prettier), and perhaps 10 in China, and N is 8 (a hundred million). Feel free to pick a value for your local Glassware

    So properly harnessed, we have at least: M * (10 ^ N) * (10 ^ 4) in compute engines available to us -- we should be able to crank out at least 100,000 samples a second ... 10 ^ 5, In cough numbers -- sufficiently accurate for our 'back of the envelope' purposes here, 10 is equal to 2 ^ 3. 2 is useful, as it is bits of key strength to solve. There are 8.6 * 10 ^ 4 seconds in a day -- call it 2 ^ 16

    so: M * 2 ^ (3 + 3 + 3 + N + 4 + 5+ 16)

    US: 2 ^ 43 key trials per day;
    China: 2 ^ 44 key trials per day.

    The old DES cipher had a 2 ^ 56 bit keyspace -- worst case time to solution is 2 ^ 13 days and always getting better as build out scales in, without even beginning to bear pre-processing tricks, One time pad reuse, identifying non-perfect implementations, planting known cribs, and the rest.

    And it is Free, free, free -- or better yet, paid for by others. What was that old saw about people living in glass houses?

    09 February 2009

    'Every move you make, every step you take'

    A while back I commented on the fact that the computers of the world seem to have issuance of traffic citations well integrated; After this piece about Italian parking citations, I received yet another citation advice, from the Milan area through the vehicle rental firm, Europcar, asserting the vehicle I was driving was noted traveling over limit.

    Maybe, but I also carry a commercial driver's license [and so drive very conservatively from habituation driving very dangerous large trucks at one time in my life]. I regularly am ridiculed by family members for never speeding, coasting up to red signals, and easing away rather than 'jack-rabbiting' off the line at a green light. As it had already been charged against my credit card, there was no sense worrying about it.

    The takeaway from this article:
    Smart traffic lights rigged to trap drivers
    is clear. I have no reason to suspect a more fastidious level of care to avoid error elsewhere in the electronic traffic citation system.

    ... typo fix: Parking, not Packing citations

    07 October 2008

    "Mr. Anderson. Welcome back; we missed you"


    When I came home, I found a couple pieces of paper mail. One from Scottsdale AZ, and the other from Bologna Italy. Google Maps indicates a separation of 5,973 miles. Another source makes it a great circle distance of 5,981 miles.

    Either way, they are each venue recently visited by family members, authorized to use my credit card.

    It appears, also, that each venue has an efficient traffic citation issuance system, and I will have the privilege to dispute a citation for driving in excess of ten miles over the speed limit (Scottsdale), and for improperly parking a vehicle (Bologna).

    At least it is late enough in the day for a single malt Scotch.